opportunities for other pleasurable gratifications of the senses widely differ. And therefore the question, Why do different individuals obtain from the totality of effort different proportions of benefit?
The reply is suggested by the actions of men in primeval barter. When man first learned that, by yielding a portion of the result of his efforts for the benefit of another in return for a portion of the benefit of the result achieved by that other, increased benefit could be obtained for himself, he naturally yielded only so much of benefit as would bring him greater benefit in return, and so also with the other. Each yielded as little and obtained as much as he could. In that intricate intertwining of effort that characterizes the civilization of to-day that primeval principle of exchange holds good. The wage of the laborer and servant, or the salary of the clerk, as a rule, is as little as can be paid for the work which each performs; likewise with the fees of the physician, lawyer, writer, painter; and, as a rule, the least consideration for which commodities can be obtained is the price that is paid for them. And likewise laborer, servant, clerk, musician, lawyer, writer, or painter, as a rule, endeavors to obtain the highest price for his services or the result of his efforts, and the merchant the highest price for his commodities. And this basis, which seems to be of unmixed selfishness, is the only basis that will lead to ultimate justice to all.
For if A produces the same quantity, quality, and result of work as B, and receives greater wages, salary, fees, or profits in return therefor, he is able to obtain from the efforts of others a greater proportion than B of all that contributes to the wellbeing of himself and of his family. That is, in return for equal contributions to the totality of effort A receives more than B, which is manifestly unjust. If there can be obtained from C, D, E, or F the same quantity, quality, and result of work as is obtained from B and for the same reward as is paid to B, society, as a whole, by paying to A a greater reward than it pays to B, C, D, E, or F, diminishes the totality of effort by the amount of effort that B, C, D, E, or F would produce in return for the difference between the reward paid to A and that paid to B, C, D, E, or F for the same result. If, however, society can not obtain from C, D, E, or F, or any other source, the same quantity, quality, and result of work as it obtains from B—except for a reward equal to that paid to A, and it needs a greater amount of such work than can be produced by B—it is obliged to avail itself of all or a portion of the efforts of A, C, D, E, and F. If it continues to obtain results from B equal to the result obtained from either A, C, D, E, or F for less reward than is paid to A, C, D, E, or F, B by reason of the discrimination has a grievance which is not ad-
