of necessary truth, merely by the unfolding of the inherited intellectual forms and faculties.
"To state the case more specifically: Before a necessary truth can be known as such, two conditions must be fulfilled. There must be a mental structure capable of grasping the terms of the proposition and the relation alleged between them; and there must be such definite deliberate mental representation of these terms as makes possible a clear consciousness of this relation. Non-fulfillment of either condition may cause non-recognition of the necessity of the truth; and may even lead to acceptance of its contrary as true. Let us take cases.
"The savage who cannot count the fingers on one hand, can frame no definite thought answering to the statement that 7 and 5 make 12; still less can he frame the consciousness that no other total is possible.
"The boy adding up figures inattentively, says to himself that 7 and 5 make 11; and may repeatedly bring out a wrong result by repeatedly making this error.
"Neither the non-recognition of the truth that 7 and 5 make 12, which in the savage results from undeveloped mental structure, nor the assertion, due to the boy's careless mental action, that they make 11, leads us to doubt the necessity of the relation between these two separately-existing numbers, and the sum they make when existing together. Nor does failure from either cause to apprehend the necessity of this relation make us hesitate to say that, when its terms are distinctly represented in thought, its necessity will be seen; and that, apart from any multiplied experiences, this necessity becomes cognizable when structures and functions are so far developed that groups of 7 and 5 and 12 can be intellectually grasped.
"Manifestly, then, there is a recognition of necessary truths, as such, which accompanies mental evolution. Along with acquirement of more complex faculty and more vivid imagination, there comes a power of perceiving to be necessary truths what were before not recognized as truths at all. And there are ascending gradations in these recognitions. Thus a boy who has intelligence enough to see that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another, may be unable to see that ratios which are severally equal to certain other ratios, that are unequal to each other, are themselves unequal; though to a more developed mind this last axiom is no less obviously necessary than the first.
"All this, which holds of logical and mathematical truths, holds, with change of terms, of physical truths. There are necessary truths in Physics, for the apprehension of which, also, a developed and disciplined intelligence is required; and, before such intelligence arises, not only may there be failure to apprehend the necessity of them, but there may be vague beliefs in their contraries. Up to comparatively
