and therefore if, in tracing back any chain of causation, we come to a point where we conclude that voluntary action manifests itself, we do not seek an explanation of that. It does not follow, however, that, because the idea of purpose is a drag on the scientific interpretation of Nature, it has no place in a rational scheme of thought. It is possible to believe, and with deep conviction, in purposes that can not be traced; and this, in our opinion, implies a more truly religious spirit than the attempt to read the petty thoughts of man into the everlasting statutes of the universe. To undertake, as the Duke of Argyll does, to indicate at what precise points in the sequence of events there must have been the introduction of a divine power does not seem to us to be religious in the best sense. At best of times we know but in part; where we know not at all let us acknowledge our ignorance, but let us not say that, because we are ignorant, we must surely be upon holier ground.
Since the above was written, a further article by the Duke of Argyll in criticism of Mr. Spencer's views has been given to the world; and, as we have our hand in, we may as well deal with it in the remaining space at our disposal. The writer declares very positively that we deceive ourselves "when we think or talk of organs being made or fitted by use," the idea being, he says, "strictly speaking nonsense," as organs are made "for use, not by use." This would be an important statement if there was only the least reason for believing it to be true, which there is not. The distinguished disputant simply assumes the conclusion which it is the purpose of his lengthy argumentation to prove. We can claim with tolerable confidence to know that organs are formed, or have been formed, by the combined action of use and natural selection, but we have absolutely no knowledge in regard to the deliberate formation of organs for use. We can not even begin to imagine what the nature of such a process would be.
The duke makes, however, a true and important remark when he says that "we have no antecedent knowledge of the Creator which can possibly entitle us to form any presumption as to his methods of operation." How vain, then, to say that He intervenes to form organs for use, creating them first in a very rudimentary form, and gradually improving them in the course of ages! It is because of their profound conviction that the Creator's ways are past finding out—that they can not possibly be level with the comprehension of man—that evolutionists limit themselves so strictly to the simple sequence and filiation of phenomena. When the duke says that he "can not accept, or even respect, the opinion of men who, in describing the facts of Nature, use perpetually the language of intention, and then repudiate the implications of that language when they talk what they call science of philosophy," he overlooks the fact referred to above, that as a general thing "the language of intention" is chosen because none other is available. When we say that running water sifts earthy matter, we may seem to use the language of intention, sifting being a definite action resulting in a definite, and what might look like a purposive, arrangement of the materials subjected thereto; but surely we are not required to attribute intention to the running water. It is difficult to please the duke, however; he declines to respect the opinions of those who use the language of intention without fully accepting all its implica-
