"The power to compete is the power to discriminate, and it is simply out of the question to have at once the absence of discrimination and the presence of competition."
And he adds:
"I regard the existing law as presenting this singular anomaly, that it seeks to enforce competition by the mandate of the statute, and at the same time to punish as criminal misdemeanors the acts and inducements by which competition is originally effected."
The unreasonable rate not made either to secure competitive traffic or to recoup losses from carrying such traffic at too low rates is so extremely rare that its very existence may well be doubted. Unjust discriminations between individuals are resorted to in order to secure by means of secret rates, rebates, or other devices a greater proportion of the traffic from or to competitive points than would be carried at open and equal rates. Discriminations between commodities result most frequently from favoring articles produced by heavy shippers or in towns at which competition is sharp, or from the fact that the railways agreeing to a particular classification have not a sufficient identity of interest to make naturally for harmony and justice. Localities either are favored unduly because they are served by competing lines, or are discriminated against in order that low rates may be maintained at other points more fortunate in this respect. The charges to local points on main and branch lines are too high relatively to those at terminals where there is competition. Yet it can not be denied that so long as the carriers are independent of each other in the matter of revenue there will be many plausible arguments available for the defense of these relations. The difficulty of dealing with such discriminations is greatly enhanced by the insufficient information upon which it is necessary to decide regarding the reasonableness of rates under present conditions. Thus, in determining whether a given rate on wheat from Chicago to New York is reasonable and just, it may be necessary to consider the rates on the same articles to Buffalo, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Boston, Montreal, Newport News, and other Eastern points not only from Chicago, but also from Minneapolis, Duluth, East St. Louis, Peoria, Cincinnati, Buffalo, and other places. Rates on flour, corn, and corn meal between any of those points may also be involved; and possibly the charges on any of the commodities named from St. Paul or St. Louis to New Orleans via the Mississippi River boats, and from New Orleans to New York or Liverpool by steamer, may in some way be connected with the controversy so as materially to affect its decision. In fact, it is impossible to set any limit to the data that may have important bearing upon the question at
