nomena of the inanimate or physical, and of the living world are fundamentally identical? The progress of physiological science has greatly increased the impetus towards the adoption of this thought as the cardinal dogma of the new faith, because the work of physiologists has been so devoted to the physical and chemical phenomena of life, that the conviction is widespread that all vital phenomena are capable of a physical explanation. Assuming that conviction to be correct, it is easy to draw the final conclusion that the physical explanation suffices for the entire universe. As to what is, or may be, behind the physical explanation, complete agnosticism is of course the only possible attitude. Such in barest—but I believe correct—outline is the history of modern monism—the doctrine that there is but one kind of power in the universe.
It is evident that monism involves the elimination of two concepts, God and consciousness. It is true that monists sometimes use these words, but it is mere jugglery, for they deny the concept for which the words actually stand. Now, consciousness is too familiar to all men to be summarily cast aside and dismissed. Some way must be found to account for it. From the monistic standpoint there is a choice between two possible alternatives; either consciousness is a form of energy, like heat, etc., or it is merely a so-called epiphenomenon. As there is no evidence that consciousness is a form of energy, only the second alternative is in reality available, and in fact has been adopted by the monists.
It is essential to have a clear notion of what is meant by an epiphenomenon. Etymologically the word indicates something which is superimposed upon the actual phenomenon. It designates an accompanying incident of a process which is assumed to have no causal relation to the further development of the process. In practice it is used chiefly in regard to the relation of the mind or consciousness to the body, and is commonly employed by those philosophers who believe that consciousness has no causal relation to any subsequent physiological process.
For many years I have tried to recognize some actual idea underneath the epiphenomenon hypothesis of consciousness, but it more and more seems clear to me that there is no idea at all, and that the hypothesis is an empty phrase, a subterfuge, which really amounts only to this—we can explain consciousness very easily by merely assuming that it does not require to be explained at all. Is not that really the confession made by the famous assertion that the consciousness of the brain no more requires explanation than the aquosity of water?
Monism is not a strong system of philosophy, for it is not so much the product of deep and original thinking as the result of a contemporary tendency. It is not the inevitable end of a logical process, because it omits consciousness, but rather an incidental result of an
