by one route or the other for the traffic between some particular points, on the whole neither route would have any very great advantage over the other in point of distance or time; either would serve efficiently the purposes of all ocean traffic in which the ports of the United States are directly interested.
The effect of this ship waterway upon the well-being of the United States is not altogether of a commercial character. As indicated by the commission, this additional bond between the two portions of the country will have a beneficial effect upon the unity of the political interests, as well as upon the commercial welfare of the country. Indeed, it is the judgment of many well-informed people that the commercial advantages resulting from a closer touch between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the country are of less consequence than the unifying of political interests.
Concisely stating the situation, its main feature may be expressed somewhat as follows:
Both routes are entirely 'practicable and feasible.'
Neither route has any material commercial advantage over the other as to time, although the distance between our Atlantic (including Gulf) and Pacific ports is less by the Nicaragua route.
The Panama route is about one fourth the length of that in Nicaragua; it has less locks, less elevation of summit-level, and far less curvature, all contributing to correspondingly decreased risks peculiar to the passage through a canal. The estimated annual cost of operation and maintenance of the Panama route is but six tenths that for the Nicaragua route.
