tion is embodied in the popular game of philopœna. Here a premium is placed upon the guarding of one's subconscious tendency to allow the complacent habit of assent or difference to express itself, and specifically towards one individual, in the conventional 'yes' or 'no'; or in taking what is naturally or unobtrusively offered. It is surprising how quickly this charge upon the subconscious becomes lost amid the more vital interests of social intercourse, how readily the hand is entrapped into an acceptance of what is extended, or the tongue into an automatic 'yes' or 'no,' when the major attention becomes directed to the channels of our real concern. A situation lightly perceived, with still slighter reflection, awakens the natural response; and it is just this relation that my data indicate. Subconscious doing ensues somewhat more readily than subconscious perceiving; while the rôle of subconscious elaboration and interpretation can not be so easily appraised. Yet it must constantly be held in mind that subconscious doing involves and indeed becomes an index of subconscious perceiving, followed typically by some measure of interpretation. And it may be well to illustrate in detail this dependence of a motor action upon a sensory clue, mindful, in our choice of illustrations, of their bearing upon the lapses that form our main pursuit. In other words, we may deliberately charge our subconscious habits with actions that spring from no real sensation. For this attitude, particularly in its personal and social aspects, we have the apt term of affectation. One may affect a lisp, or a foreign pronunciation, or the broad a, or, with the changes of the fashions, an exaggerated hand-shake or manner of raising one's hat; and throughout the series there is constant danger of lapsing back into the natural form of expression. The affectation thus attempts to guide consciously what should be guided subconsciously; it attempts for some special effect to pass current as a natural habit, what really is the issue of a watchful guidance. The actor has professional occasion to cultivate such affectation; and it is sometimes amusing to detect the inexperienced actor reminding himself that he must no longer use his wounded arm, must continue to limp, or to reel, or to exhibit the manners of old age, or of the ruffian, or of the peasant. This artificial relation is interesting in that it presents in exact reverse the ordinary intrusions of the subconscious into the conscious field. The one formula expresses the fact that when the proper sensory clue is present we proceed to react to it without intent; and the other that having only a fictitious sensory clue we fail to act in spite of our resolution.[1]
- ↑ The more usual lapse of this temporary type occurs where the sensory clue is slight enough to pass readily in and out of notice; thus if one has slightly injured a finger, one is intermittently reminded by a sudden pain that it can not be used for the accustomed service; one steps upon a foot that is
