was his friend and admirer and at his request gave this certificate. Bellarmine died in 1621 and could not be called as a witness in 1632. When Galileo was called upon to defend himself for teaching the Copernican doctrine in his Dialogues, which had given great offense, he produced this certificate and called attention to its wording, which differs materially from that of the protocol of February 26, being much less stringent in form. In essence it is the same; to teach a doctrine as true is to 'defend' it. Cardinal Bellarmine did not have the protocol before him in writing the informal certificate. The prohibition of the latter is, however, precise and absolute; the doctrine 'can not be defended,' that is, taught in any way as if it were true. It can not even be 'held,' silently. It represented the attitude of the cardinal's mind precisely; the church would not suffer if its terms were obeyed. In reading Galileo's defense of 1632-3, we shall see the use he made of the discrepancy between these two documents, one formal and of record (February 26), the other friendly and informal (May 26).
It is the theory of Gebler in his careful history, 'Galileo Galilei and the Roman Curia,' that the genuine document of February 26 is not a true record of the facts. He admits that it was written in its proper place by the notary. He finds an 'obvious contradiction' between a formal command 'not in any way to hold or defend,' which are the words of the process of 1633, and the prohibition of Bellarmine's certificate 'not to defend or hold.' After an examination of all the documents it is impossible, I think, to take Gebler's view. It is necessary to admit the words of the genuine documents to mean precisely what they say.
Gebler lays down three facts as indisputable: '(I.) Galileo did not receive any prohibition except the cardinal's admonition not to defend or hold the Copernican doctrine; (II.) Entire silence on the subject was therefore not enjoined upon him; (III.) The second part of the note in the Vatican MS. of February 26, 1616, is therefore untrue.' My own conclusions are entirely different as to all three prohibitions. The Cardinal's admonitions are, in effect, absolutely the same as those of the formal prohibition; silence was enjoined, and more than this Galileo was forbidden to hold certain opinions even mentally and silently. If not, what does Bellarmine mean by the word 'hold'? Is it, I ask, credible that an authority that forbids a man to hold an opinion, even silently, would permit him to teach it? To ask the question is to answer it. When Galileo taught the opinion he disobeyed the orders of a Church whose authority he fully admitted during the whole of his life.
Within the assigned limits of this paper the matter can not be discussed at length. Two points may be touched upon however.
