genuity are fixed. Yet all the while, under all customs of conflict, all political administrations, in every age, certain changeless principles underlie and determine changing methods of action. These things can never become obsolete; the ingenuity by which Rome taught herself to emulate and at last excel in the first Punic war, and that victory comes not so much by the possession of big forces as by having Drakes and Frobishers pitted against a Medina Sidonia.
In every condition of battle, and especially having reference to our own defense on the Atlantic coast from a powerful adversary on the sea, two great principles assert themselves as essential; first is the establishment of defensive relations, by both fortifications and squadrons, and second, the ability to concentrate swiftly and effectively at any threatened point the full measure of naval effectiveness at our command.
A hostile fleet coming upon our coast for purposes of offense would have the advantage of being able to concentrate at any desired point, to select the city that it sought to doom to destruction or spoliation. The timid citizens of New York, who a few years ago had their fears so excited, may take contort in knowing that of all our great sea-board cities, theirs is probably in least danger of bombardment. Gruesome tales were told of the ease with which foreign war ships could float broadside off Coney Island, to send round shot and shell into Broadway and Fifth Avenue. Calm your fears or assuage them; no doubt a hostile fleet can select and concentrate; but of all exposed points it is least likely to choose New York. The reason for this comparative immunity lies in the fact that the Hudson River empties into the ocean at the apex of a reentrant sea-angle, the base of which is found on a line drawn from the end of Long Island at the east to either the Capes of the Delaware or those of the Chesapeake at the south. At Philadelphia and in Hampton Roads are naval stations, and also at Newport and New London. It is reasonable to assume that at all these would be war vessels, which concentrating would be likely to furnish a force to assail an enemy upon the sea in the rear located off Sandy Hook. Formidable or fortunate would an attacking force be to avoid or avert some form of disaster, if not complete destruction. In war, as in the lightning stroke, energy is apt to take the line of least resistance, and it may, I think, be quite confidently asserted that some other city, not possessed of this advantage, would be the one most exposed to attack; Boston and Portland in the north, and on the south Charleston or Savannah.
We shall not enter into any details concerning movements of land forces, nor do more than call attention to the strength of our present sea-coast batteries. I would not lull you to a too great confidence that that strength is sufficient, nor that even torpedoes, fixed or floating, are certainly effective; nor is it necessary to excite further alarm by sug-
