each other in the same order, and yet these two changes are regarded by us as very different; the first is a displacement, the second a change of state. Why? Because in the first case it is sufficient for me to go around the sphere to place myself opposite the red hemisphere and reestablish the original red sensation.
Still more; if the two hemispheres, in place of being red and blue, had been yellow and green, how should I have interpreted the revolution of the sphere? Before, the red succeeded the blue, now the green succeeds the yellow; and yet I say that the two spheres have undergone the same revolution, that each has turned about its axis; yet I can not say that the green is to yellow as the red is to blue; how then am I led to decide that the two spheres have undergone the same displacement? Evidently because, in one case as in the other, I am able to reestablish the original sensation by going around the sphere, by making the same movements, and I know that I have made the same movements because I have felt the same muscular sensations; to know it, I do not need, therefore, to know geometry in advance and to represent to myself the movements of my body in geometric space.
Another example: An object is displaced before my eye; its image was first formed at the center of the retina; then it is formed at the border; the old sensation was carried to me by a nerve fiber ending at the center of the retina; the new sensation is carried to me by another nerve fiber starting from the border of the retina; these two sensations are qualitatively different; otherwise, how could I distinguish them?
Why then am I led to decide that these two sensations, qualitatively different, represent the same image, which has been displaced? It is because I can follow the object with the eye and by a displacement of the eye, voluntary and accompanied by muscular sensations, bring back the image to the center of the retina and reestablish the primitive sensation.
I suppose that the image of a red object has gone from the center A to the border B of the retina, then that the image of a blue object goes in its turn from the center A to the border B of the retina; I shall decide that these two objects have undergone the same displacement. Why? Because in both cases I shall have been able to reestablish the primitive sensation, and that to do it I shall have had to execute the same movement of the eye, and I shall know that my eye has executed the same movement because I shall have felt the same muscular sensations.
If I could not move my eye, should I have any reason to suppose that the sensation of red at the center of the retina is to the sensation of red at the border of the retina as that of blue at the center is to that of blue at the border? I should only have four sensations qualitatively different, and if I were asked if they are connected by the proportion I have just stated, the question would seem to me ridiculous,