escape that frequent failing of German scholarship—the squandering of Herculean labor in the compilation of specific details, "facts," in other words, upon an inadequate conception of the general bearings of the subject. There comes to mind a "standard" work upon the humanism of the Renaissance, a book cited among the best in bibliographies. It consists almost entirely of a series of little essays on various humanists, containing very miscellaneous information and tacked together by artificial literary transitions. One might take a large sheet of paper, write the names of the humanists in a vertical column, set against these in succeeding columns such points as date of birth and death, parentage, patrons, pupils, chief writings, purity of Latinity, knowledge of Greek, religious attitude, and have before one not merely the whole volume but more, since now one would be in a better position to grasp the subject as a whole and see to some slight extent how individuals worked together to make a movement
The scientific historian will see not only that his theme must be developed systematically, but also that every concept which may be implicated in his investigation must be sharply defined and henceforth consistently treated from that one point of view. The field must be fenced in, if any truth is to be corralled. If one is trying to bring out characteristics of a given period of time, evidently one must limit oneself to it. If a "movement" or an institution is concerned, it should be as exactly defined as possible in terms of those phenomena, qualities, and tendencies which are peculiar to it. Thus its gradual beginning, height and fading may be adequately recognized and discriminated from each other and from events contemporary but unconnected with either. Indeed, the historian who has denied the existence of "facts" will be inclined to look askance also at periods, movements and institutions. He will shake himself free from unjustifiable historical conglomerates as well as from false historical units. We shall get from his pen no dreary historical miscellanies, no omnibus biographies. He will be trying to prove something and will assume nothing.
While then the scientific historian will sharply define every concept and field, he will not make the mistake of thinking that some portion of the historical field can be fenced off and studied by itself, as investigators of periods and places too often do now. In history's continuity and complexity not only have particulars no reality, but generalizations have no truth unless followed through the whole stream. They may take on a different significance when brought into contact with other truths. Historical measurements have relative rather than absolute value. They must be in more than one dimension. Is this asking too much? Must the historical investigator know everything before he can find out anything? Not if he does not attempt to discover too much or to measure that which has too many relations—as does a period. Not if he takes a problem sufficiently precise and limited to be covered, as it should be, by considering everything that is likely to have any
