workman be a unionist, he must, if he be consistent, slacken his pace to that of the poorer one's, and hence in such shops the employer usually gets the efficiency he pays for. The question, therefore, which must be settled before all others, if the efficiency scheme is to be adopted, is: how shall differences in efficiency be measured?
Obviously to base a wage scale upon mere personal judgment as to the relative efficiency of men working within a shop would be out of the question, not only because it opens the way for charges of personal favoritism and consequent labor difficulties, but also because the complexity of modern shops would make such a plan physically impossible. The introduction of the simple piece-work plan was hailed as a great advance, as it unquestionably was from certain points of view, but here, too, failure was inevitable. Pace setting with the regular "trimming down" of wage scales was certain to produce bad feeling amongst the men, if no worse evils resulted, which was improbable. The workmen, too, were held responsible for all errors, which is obviously unfair—and bad policy for the employer, besides. Moreover, the plan is based upon a fundamental fallacy, namely, that a just scale of wages based on piece-work can be made which will at all times and under all conditions be just. The universal objection on the part of labor unions to simple piece-work has both theoretical and practical justification.
In view of these facts, modifications were suggested, notably in the Halsey, Rowan, Emerson and Taylor systems.[1] Space does not permit a discussion of the relative merits of these systems, even though it might fall within the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that a scheme had to be devised of accurate, concise individual records that could be used so as to be fair to the employer, yet that should recognize and encourage the good workman while it did not discourage the poor one. This has been done after considerable experimentation by efficiency engineers, and has proven satisfactory. The Holerith Service Requisition card[2] is a fair sample of what can be done along this line, and makes it possible to measure relative efficiency of workmen, not only with each other, but with whatever standard existing conditions justify.
We are now in a position to consider the other side of the question. What is the attitude of the laboring man to these efficiency schemes? It must be admitted that so far as organized labor, at least, is concerned its opposition is almost universal, and that this opposition has been the source of much criticism. Two questions naturally present themselves at this juncture: why does unionism oppose the efforts of the efficiency engineer, and second, what will be the ultimate outcome of such opposition? Let us consider these queries in their logical order.
