consumer turns the management of his interest in the business over to the other party, together with the fact that when once these contributions are made they can not practicably be withdrawn, establishes the right of the user to fair treatment at the hands of the public utility company. Still stronger appears the user's right to fair treatment when it is considered that he is, in the very nature of the case, the residual investor. That is, under any plan to establish such rates as will provide a "fair return" to the money investor, the user must hold himself ready at any time to meet all demands for financial support involved in the operations of the utility. The user may not provide additional money capital in the early years of development, and may never indeed do so. But if such becomes necessary, the user must, as will be seen, assume the burden of interest charges created by the required borrowing. Mutual obligations between the user and the producer follow naturally as a result of mutual interests. These obligations are as binding on one as on the other. Responsibility for fair treatment has in the past rested with the producer exclusively, because he has occupied the position of control. Unfortunately, the user has not been convinced by the treatment that he has received that his rights have had the recognition they are entitled to. The present movement has resulted, and the relative obligations of both parties are now very generally understood. The investor and producer must be secured in an adequate, "fair return" on his investment. The investment does not necessarily include all the money spent in creating the utility. It is no part of the user's duty to secure to the investor a return on funds spent unwisely, unnecessarily or in any improper way. For instance, construction work might have been done and paid for at an exorbitant rate. It later might develop that the officials in charge of construction were materially interested in the contract and had paid for work at unwarrantable prices because it was to their own advantage to do so. This is the simplest case. More involved ones have not infrequently occurred having essentially the same result. Such expenditures are not wise or necessary by any means, and the user is not bound to recognize them as a part of the investment on which the producer is entitled to a "fair return."
The chief right of the user is to receive efficient service at a rate as low as possible consistent with the right of the investor to receive his "fair return." It is the obligation of the producer to see that this service is provided at a "fair rate" consistent with the conditions under which the public utility is expected to operate. It is the consciousness of these mutual obligations that is the basis of laws restraining public service corporations. The user has seen his investment exploited for the benefit, not of himself, but of the producer. The capitalization of anticipated profits, stock dividends, unduly large underwriting fees in effecting combinations, common "watering" of stock, manipulating and
