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Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 9.djvu/108

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THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY.

most unequivocal instance I have ever known of conscience being manifested by an animal.

I had had this dog for several years, and had never—even in his puppyhood—known him to steal. On the contrary, he used to make an excellent guard to protect property from other animals, servants, etc., even though these were his best friends.[1] Nevertheless, on one occasion he was very hungry, and, in the room where I was reading and he was sitting, there was, within easy reach, a savory muttonchop. I was greatly surprised to see him stealthily remove this chop and take it under a sofa. However, I pretended not to observe what had occurred, and waited to see what would happen next. For fully a quarter of an hour this terrier remained under the sofa without making a sound, but doubtless enduring an agony of contending feelings. Eventually, however, conscience came off victorious, for, emerging from his place of concealment and carrying in his mouth the stolen chop, he came across the room and laid the tempting morsel at my feet. The moment he dropped the stolen property he bolted again under the sofa, and from this retreat no coaxing could charm him for several hours afterward. Moreover, when during that time he was spoken to or patted, he always turned away his head in a ludicrously conscience-stricken manner. Altogether I do not think it would be possible to imagine a more satisfactory exhibition of conscience by an animal than this; for it must be remembered, as already stated, that the particular animal in question was never beaten in its life.[2]Advance-sheets of the Quarterly Journal of Science.

  1. I have seen this dog escort a donkey which had baskets on its back filled with apples. Although the dog did not know that he was being observed by anybody, he did his duty with the utmost faithfulness; for, every time the donkey turned back its head to take an apple out of the baskets, the dog snapped at its nose; and such was his watchfulness that, although his companion was keenly desirous of tasting some of the fruit, he never allowed him to get a single apple during the half-hour they were left together. I have also seen this terrier protecting meat from other terriers (his sons), which lived in the same house with him, and with which he was on the very best of terms. More curious still, I have seen him seize my wristbands while they were being worn by a friend to whom I temporarily lent them.
  2. This latter point is most important, because, although the moral sentiment in its incipient stages undoubtedly depends in a large measure upon fear of punishment, still, in its more developed state, this sentiment is as undoubtedly independent of such fear (Cf. Bain, "Mental and Moral Science," pp. 456-459, 1875); and forasmuch as in our analysis of animal psychology we can be guided only by the study of outward actions, and forasmuch as the course of action prompted by direct fear of punishment will nearly always be identical with that prompted by true conscience, it is of the first importance to obtain cases such as the above, in which mere dread of punishment cannot even be suspected to have been the motive principle of action.