by Darwinism, the doctrine of design is simply enlarged and seen to operate with a wider scope, and to stand upon a more comprehensive basis. He is by no means oblivious of the difficulties with which teleology is encompassed, and recognizes that it was the subject of powerful philosophical assault before Darwinism arose. But he sees also that the obstacles to the acceptance of the principle were due to the old ante-Darwinian views of the "Origin of Species." We can do no justice to this closely-reasoned essay by quotation from it, as it requires to be fully and carefully read to get a clear view of the author's position. A brief passage or two may, however, help to indicate it. Speaking of the contradiction involved in the old teleological interpretation of the origin of the organs and parts of living creatures, he says:
"The error, as we suppose, lies in the combination of the principle of design with the hypothesis of the immutability and isolated creation of species. The latter hypothesis, in its nature improbable, has, on scientific grounds, become so far improbable that few, even of the anti-Darwinian naturalists, now hold to it; and, whatever may once have been its religious claims, it is at present a hindrance rather than a help to any just and consistent teleology.
"By the adoption of the Darwinian hypothesis, or something like it, which we incline to favor, many of the difficulties are obviated, and others diminished. In the comprehensive and far-reaching teleology which may take the place of the former narrow conceptions, organs and even faculties, useless to the individual, find their explanation and reason of being. Either they have done service in the past or they may do service in the future. They may have been essentially useful in one way in a past species, and, though now functionless, they may be turned to useful account in some very different way hereafter. In botany several cases come to our mind which suggest such interpretation."
And again:
"Darwinian teleology has the special advantage of accounting for the imperfections and failures as well as for successes. It not only accounts for them, but turns them to practical account. It explains the seeming waste as being part and parcel of a great economical process. Without the competing multitude, no strangle for life; and, without this, no natural selection and survival of the fittest, no continuous adaptation to changing surroundings, no diversification and improvement, leading from lower up to higher and nobler forms. So the most puzzling things of all to the old-school ideologists are the principia of the Darwinian. In this system the forms and species, in all their variety, are not mere ends in themselves, but the whole a series of means and ends, in the contemplation of which we may obtain higher and more comprehensive, and perhaps worthier, as well as more consistent, views of design in Nature than heretofore. At least, it would appear that in Darwinian evolution we may have a theory that accords with if it does not explain the principal facts, and a teleology that is free from the common objections.
"But is it a teleology, or rather—to use the new-fangled term—a dysteleology? That depends upon how it is held. Darwinian evolution (whatever may be said of other kinds) is neither theistical nor non-theistical. Its relations to the question of design belong to the natural theologian, or, in the larger sense, to the philosopher. So long as the world lasts it will probably be open to any one to hold consistently, in the last resort, either of the two hypotheses, that of a divine mind or that of no divine mind. There is no way that we know of by which the alternative may be excluded. Viewed philosophically, the question only is, Which is the better supported hypothesis of the two?
"We have only to say that the Darwinian system, as we understand it, coincides well with the theistic view of Nature. It not only acknowledges purpose (in the Contemporary Reviewer's sense), but builds upon it; and if purpose in this sense does not of itself imply design, it is certainly compatible with it, and suggestive of it. Difficult as it may be to conceive and impossible to demonstrate design in a whole of which the series of parts appear to be contingent, the alternative may be yet more difficult and less satisfactory. If all Nature is of a piece—as modern physical philosophy insists—then it seems clear that design must in some way, and in some sense, pervade the system, or be wholly absent from it. Of the alternatives, the predication of design—special, general, or universal, as the case may be—is most natural to the mind; while the exclusion of it throughout, because some utilities may happen, many adaptations may be contingent results, and no organic maladaptations could continue, runs counter to such analogies as we have to guide us, and leads to a conclusion which few men ever rested in."
It may be added that Dr. Gray's volume is eminently readable, and, though dealing with "solid" subjects, is far from "heavy." The author has a great deal more humor about him than the student of his botanical manuals would be led to suspect. But the readers of "Darwiniana" will find that he is not only capable of fun, but has given it a pretty free vent in these pages. He seems half inclined to apologize for this, saying in his preface:
"If it be objected that some of these pages are written in a lightness of vein not quite congruous with the gravity of the subject and the
