men whom he had helped over many a trying place, come up and demand the
last penny due them. At the Ladd & Tilton Bank a man of different fiber took
command. He, too, stood behind the cashier to see the rush of gold deplete the
coffers of that first bank that had never delayed any demand. Confident, un-
moved, stern, if not defiant, Theodore Wilcox stood off the raging storm to pro-
tect the honor of his deceased friend, and closed the bank at night after an
all-day attack, with every demand paid in full. And there are hundreds of men
who persist in believing to this day that it was the nerve and courage of Wilcox
that saved the bank quite as much as the coin.
Of course such a storm and shock could not be repaired in a day. Of tlie seven banking institutions that were closed by that panic, only one of them ever opened again for business. They were wound up either by the courts or the government. As a result of that panic, there were a vast number of foreclosures of mortgages as well as actions and judgments ; and it has been estimated that about one-half the real property in the county changed hands in consequence of such foreclosures and sheriffs sales. And the city was nearly seven years in recovering from the losses and general disarrangement influcted on property holders and business men.
It is necessary to state here that "The Portland Trust Company of Oregon," founded by Benjamin I. Cohen, of which Henry L. Pittock is now president, was also one of the financial institutions which did not close its doors during the panic of 1893. Although not at that time doing a large banking business, yet it was doing considerable, and it paid every demand in full as fast as presented.
THE SQUEEZE OF 1907.
About the month of September, 1907, some retail banker away back at Wall Street, New York, started the story that there was just about to be a financial cataclysm in the shape of a panic wherein the curbstone brokers along the said street would not be able to borrow any more money to keep their honest industry of speculating in stocks going. That was enough. The story was started ; and within twelve hours, it was wired all over the United States and spread broadcast over the whole country through the columns of millions of sheets of daily news- papers. Everybody stopped from the Atlantic to the Pacific to inquire about it, and would not move another peg until they found out whether there was any- thing in it for them. This stopping for even twenty-four hours, sent the cold chills streaming up and down the backs of several millions of men who had all sorts of schemes afloat, or owed debts, or wanted to borrow money. And so there was a very mild sort of a panic. There was no cause for it. Business was good all over the United States, and especially good in Portland, Oregon. But the lies and insinuations and the ever present suspicions and fears soon locked up the hoards of the timid and the millions of the capitalist. It was known that a couple of savings banks in town had been skyrocketing with other people's money in telephone bonds, irrigation bonds and timber land speculations. But all that, and all the noise that such concerns could make, would not have made as much dust as the fly on the cartwheel. But when a retrospective view is taken, the denouement of the scare looks amusing if not farcical. A section of an Ore- gon statute authorizes the governor of Oregon to designate and proclaim legal holidays. And on kgal holidays nobody can transact any lawful business. So the banks arranged with the governor of Oregon to proclaim holidays from day to day until the said banks were prepared to meet their depositors and do busi- ness. And under the arrangement, the banks could receive deposits, but they were not under obligations to pay out deposits, or pay anything. This was chap- ter No. I.
Now we come to chapter No. 2. After securing the holidays, the clearing house banks proceeded to create and issue some fiat money. Any mem- ber of the Clearing House Association that needed more circulation, would take
