Ch.VII. SecIL] Pardons^ Reprieves^ ^c, 89 which may urge a man to the commission of an offence ; or foresee all the shades in the circumstances of a case which may extenuate the guilt of the accused. An offence may be within the letter, but foreign to the general scope and spirit of the law. " If we consider accurately the nature of human punishment, we shall find it attended with unavoidable im- perfections. How short is our discernment! The surface of things and actions is alone exposed to our view: the inward thoughts, the habitual temper, which form the greater part of moral conduct, are entirely concealed from us. It is for this reason that laws assign the same name, nature, and penalty to all offences, which bear a conformity in outward resemblance, though intrinsically varying from one another, by a thousand circumstances, known only to the Searcher of hearts («)." As, therefore, society cannot sufficiently provide for every possible transgression of its ordinances, and measure by antici- pation the degree of guilt which may attach to the offender, it has entrusted the King with the power of extending mercy to him. The coronation oath requires the King to temper justice with mercy; and it was the expression of the unfortu- nate Lord Strafford, that " the King condemns no man : the great operation of his sceptre is mercy" — a generous principle, which seems to have been sometimes acted upon in this coun- try, even in the worst and more dreary periods of our his- tory. The King is, in legal contemplation, injured by the com- mission of public offences; his peace is said to be violated thereby, and the right to pardon cannot be vested more pro- perly than in the Sovereign, who is, from his situation, more likely than any other person to exercise it with impartiality, and to whom good policy requires that the people should look, with submissive respect, as the head of the nation, and su- preme guardian of the laws. It seems, that anciently the right of pardoning offences, within certain districts, was claimed by the lords of marches and others, who possessed^Wa regalia {h) ; but the statute 27 Hen. 8. c. 24. s. 1. vests the sole right of pardoning in the King. This right, or rather prerogative, belongs to a King defacto^ and not to the King dejure^ during (a) Considerations on the I^w of For- (A) Co. Lit. 114. 3 Inst. 235. Bac. feitur«for High Treason, 1748, by the Ab. Pardon, A; Jlonourable Mr. York. the
