Ch. 1.3 Principles of the Cojistitution^ ^c, S make rapid encroachments on, and gradually assume, the reins of government. The King is, therefore, very properly a con- stituent part of Parliament; in which capacity he possesses the means of preserving inviolate his rights and prerogatives, as supreme executive magistrate, by withholding his assent at pleasure, and without stating any reason, to the enactment of provisions tending to their prejudice. It is, however, only for the purpose of protecting the regal executive authority that the constitution has assigned to the King a share in legis- lation : this purpose is sufficiently ensured by placing in the Crown the negative power of rejecting suggested laws. The royal legislative right is not of the deliberative kind ; the Crown has no power to propound laws ; and it would have a dangerous tendency and influence, if the King were allowed to recommend from the throne what laws ought to be passed ; as was done by some of our arbitrary Sovereigns, and by the Roman Emperors, whose orationes were the exact patterns to which the senatus considta were to conform. Important, therefore, as this prerogative of rejection is as a shield against rebellious encroachments, as a preservative of the royal executive function, it is, in other points of view, of a limited and negative nature. Though the King is said to be the caput, priticipium, et Jlnis of Parliament, he is but a part of it, and, per se, possesses no legislative power. Though his Majesty alone can call Parliament together, and dissolve its authority, these rights are purely of the executive kind. In a constitutional point of view, however, the legislative power is lodged in the King, subject to the assent of the Houses of Parliament. Laws are said to be enacted " bi/ the King's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons in Parliament assembled." As supreme executive magistrate, the King possesses, sub- ject to the law of the land, exclusive, deliberative, and more decided, more extensive, and more discretionary rights and powers. These are wisely placed in a single hand by the British constitution, for the sake of unanimity, strength, and dispatch. Were they placed in many hands, they would be subject to many wills ; many wills, if disunited, and drawing different ways, create weakness in a government; and, to unite those several wills, and reduce them to one, B 2 is
