Chw XIII. Sec. 11.] Mon$trans de droit. SSIj ties, and the reasons urged therein {a) against it. The party assumes, and acts throughout on the face of the proceedings in the character of a defendant : he shews his right in the shape V of a plea: the Attorney-General i-eplies, and the subject when he takes the issue ponit se super patriam, as on the other hand the Attorney-General in that case petit quod inquiratur per patriam. And Lord Somei's in his argument on this sub- ject ip) observed, " I take it to be generally true, that in all cases where the subject is in the nature of a plaintiff, to recover any thing from the King, his only remedy at common law, is to sue by petition to the person of the King. I say, when the subject comes as a plaintiff. For, when upon a title found, for the King by office, the subject comes in to traverse the King's title, or to shew his own right, he comes in in the nature of a defendant ; and is admitted to interplead in that case with the King in defence of his title, which otherwise would be defeated by finding the office." And in another part he said explicitly : " in this sort of proceeding {n)iz, a monstrans de droit), the subject is in the nature of a defendant, and comes in and pleads to a title found for the King." The decision in Rex v. Roberts (c) is also to the same effect. In that case Roberts having traversed an inquisition whereby he was found a lunatic, the Attorney-General filed the common (replication, and the proceedings being sent from the petty bag office to the King's Bench, the prosecutor of the commis- sion made up the record and carried it down to trial. Upon which it was objected that the supposed lunatic was in the na- ture of a plaintiff; and therefore had the right to carry down the record. And his traverse is in the nature of a monstrans de droit [d). " To which it was answered and resolved by the Court, that he was properly considered as a defendant oppo- sing the title found for the Crown, without setting up any title in himself; as he might do in a petition of right. And indeed it would be absurd to construe the liberty of traversing to give a power of delaying the Crown, which must be if the party is considered as having the common right of a plaintiff. It was (a) 5 Bac. Ab. 574. And see Tre- (h) 11 St.Tr. 154. imain Entr. 628, 65'i. Co. Kntr. 404. (c) 2 Stra. 1208. 4 H. 6. 13. a. Vaugh. R. 62. Bro. (d) Query, a Traverse, 2 and 3 Ed. Ab. Traverse, D. Office, 5i. 6. c. 8. s^ 6. ^ ■- A A 2 therefore - k
