invasion. The ideas put forward by the author of the Battle of Dorking, to a large extent, prevail. Our military authorities have, in the last few years, elaborated a system of defence for the metropolis; large sums of money have been lavished on forts, intended to protect Chatham, Portsmouth, &c., from the attack of an invading army. It is surely better to prevent an enemy from landing than to take elaborate and costly measures to meet him after he has landed. 'Aucune personne de bon sens ne songera à nous voir assez maitres de la Manche pour opérer un débarquement et pour ravitailler une armée débarquée.' So says Admiral de la Reveillere in the article already quoted. In England it has been generally the practice of late years to estimate the probabilities of invasion in defiance of the lessons of our history. Two hundred years ago Lord Torrington demonstrated the value of the 'Fleet in being' as an absolute protection against invasion, as has been so well pointed out by Admiral Colomb. For nearly two years Napoleon lay encamped on the heights above Boulogne with over 130,000 of the flower of his army, waiting for that opportunity which never came; and it must be remembered that Napoleon had one chance of success which cannot occur again. The boats and vessels in which the invading army was to be embarked could be propelled by means of oars; the British ships which were to destroy them were mainly dependent on the wind. In a calm it was possible for the Boulogne flotilla to have moved without the British ships being able to reach them. Such a chance of success is not possible in these days of steam. In the fine passage with which he opens his account of the history of these two years Captain Mahan points
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