IMPERIAL DEFENCE.
with our own. 'No amount of foresight or calculation' Lord George Hamilton has said, 'can anticipate naval combinations and naval movements; therefore it seems to me essential that, for the purpose of meeting such unexpected blows, we should have a considerable margin of reserve.'
French torpedo-boat attack upon British fleets.There is one form of attack which does not fall under any of the three heads under which we have been considering the principles of Imperial defence. The British naval manoeuvres of the last three years have shown (1) that the English shores of the Channel are well within the range of torpedo-boat attack from the stations which have been recently established from Dunkirk to Brest; (2) that the mere menace of torpedo-boat attack is sufficient to seriously retard the junction of two powerful fleets. In view of our recent experience, it is probably true to say that the principal danger we have to fear in the event of war with France is an attack by torpedo-boats on our assembling fleets at Plymouth, Portland, or Spithead—similar to that made by Captain Barry's flotilla on Sir George Tryon's fleet in Plymouth Sound in the manoeuvres of 1890. An offensive defence, it was clearly shown by the manoeuvres of 1891, is the best way of meeting such an
attack. We must have numerous 'torpedo-boat destroyers,' fast enough to catch and powerful enough to destroy the torpedo-boats of the enemy. We may congratulate ourselves that a first step has already been taken in this sound line of policy. More than this is required by the circumstances of the case. The anchorages at our Channel naval ports sorely need additional protection, by means of breakwaters,[1]- ↑ These have been constructed at Portland, &c.
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