nously exerting its own energy, separates the one from being, and being from the one, leads each into divided multitude, and thus generates total number. For number, as we have frequently said, is divided and not united multitude, and subsists from the principles according to a second progression, but is not occultly established in the principles. Hence also, it is simply different from multitude. And in intelligibles indeed, there is multitude; but in intellectuals number. For there indeed, number is according to cause; but here multitude is according to participation. For there indeed, division subsists intelligibly; but here union has an intellectual subsistence. If therefore number proceeds from these, and is allotted such an order, Parmenides very properly especially mentions these triads, asserting that the one participates of essence, and essence of the one,[1] and that through these the many become apparent. For one of these indeed, is the illustrious property of the first triad, but the other of the third triad. And in the first triad indeed, participation[2] was the presubsistence of the union of the one and being; but in the third triad many intelligibles present themselves to the view, Plato all but proclaiming that the most splendid of intelligibles subsists according to intelligible multitude, though multitude is there occult, and uniformly. For according to each order of divine natures, multitude is appropriately generated in the extremities.
CHAPTER XXIX.
The intelligible number therefore of the intellectual genera, proceeds from these, and through these. And it possesses indeed properties in-
