of things, and this, as it appears to me in the greatest perfection possible to man. For the reasoning is every where consummately accurate, and deduced from self-evident principles; and the conclusions are the result of what Plato powerfully calls geometrical necessities. To the reader of this work indeed, who has not been properly disciplined in Eleatic and Academic studies, and who has not a genius naturally adapted to such abstruse speculations, it will doubtless appear to be perfectly unintelligible, and in the language of critical cant, nothing but jargon and revery. This, however, is what Plato the great hierophant of this theology predicted would be the case, if ever it was unfolded to the multitude at large. “For as it appears to me, says he, there are scarcely any particulars which will be considered by the multitude more ridiculous than these; nor again, any which will appear more wonderful and enthusiastic to those who are naturally adapted to perceive them.”[1]
In his seventh epistle also he observes as follows: “Thus much, however, I shall say respecting all those who either have written or shall write, affirming that they know those things which are the objects of my study (whether they have heard them from me or from others, or whether they have discovered them themselves) that they have not heard any thing about these things conformable to my opinion: for I never have written nor ever shall write about them.[2] For a thing of this kind cannot be expressed by words like other disciplines, but by long familiarity, and living in conjunction with the thing itself, a light[3] as it were leaping from a fire will on a sudden be enkindled in the soul, and there itself nourish itself.” And shortly after he adds; “But if it appeared to me that the particulars of which I am speaking could be sufficiently communicated to the multitude by writing or speech, what could we accomplish more beautiful in life than to impart a mighty benefit to mankind, and lead an intelligible nature into light, so as to be obvious to all men? I think, however, that an attempt of this kind would only be beneficial to a few, who from some small vestiges previously demonstrated are themselves able to discover these abstruse particulars. But with respect to the rest of mankind, some it will fill with a contempt by no means elegant, and others with a lofty and arrogant hope that they shall now learn certain venerable things.”[4]
- ↑ Σχεδον γαϱ ως εμοι δοκει, ουκ εστι τουτων προς τους πολλους καταγελαστοτερα ακουσματα, ου δ’ αυ προς τους ευφυεις θανμαστοτερα τε και ενθουσιαστικωτερα. Epist. 2.
- ↑ Plato means by this, that he has never written perspicuously about intelligibles or true beings, the proper objects of intellect.
- ↑ This light is a thing of a very different kind from that which is produced by the evidence arising from truths perceptible by the multitude, as those who have experienced it well know.
- ↑ Τοσονδε γε μην περι παντων εχω φϱαζειν των γεγραφοτων και γραψαντων, οσοι φασιν ειδεναι πεϱι ων εγω σπουδαζω, ειτ’ εμου ακηκοοτες, ειτ’ αλλων, ειθ’ ως ευϱοντες αυτοι, τουτους ουκ εστι κατα γε την εμην δοξαν περι του πραγματος επαϊειν ονδεν, ουκ ουν εμον γε περι αυτων εστι συγγραμμα, ουδε μη ποτε γενηται· ρητον γαρ ουδαμως εστιν, ως αλλα μαθηματα, αλλ’ εκ πολλης συνουσιας γιγνομενης περι το πραγμα αυτο, και του συζην, εξαιφνης οιον απο πυρος πηδησαντος (lege πηδησαν) εξαφθεν φως, εν τῃ ψυχῃ γενομενον αντο εαντο ηδη τρεφει.—Ει δε μοι εφαινετο γραπτεα θ’ ικανως ειναι προς τους πολλους και ρητα, τι τουτου καλλιον επεπρακτ’ αν ημιν εν τῳ βιῳ, η τοις τε ανθρωποισι μεγα οφελος γραψαι, και την φυσιν εις φως τοις πασι πϱοσαγαγειν; αλλ’ ουτε ανθρωποις ηγουμαι την επιχειϱησιν περι αυτων λεγομενην αγαθον, ει μη τισιν ολιγοις, οποσοι δυνατοι ανευρειν αυτοι δια μικρας ενδειξεως· των τε δη αλλων, τονς μεν καταφρονησεως ουκ οϱθως εμπλησειεν αν ουδαμῃ εμμελους, τους δε υψηλης και χαυνης ελπιδος, ως σεμν’ αττα μεμαθηκοτας.
