ment, into the trenches beyond the town, and about an hour after for Colonel Earl’s. It was reported that several great officers were for fighting, and wished the Duke to send for the horse, who were most of them gone foraging as far as Carlingford; but his answer was, Let them alone, we will see what they will do. He received several fresh accounts that the enemy advanced, and always bid, Let them alone. . . . . Our gunners sent from the works to see if they might fire amongst the enemy, who by this time were within cannon-shot; but the Duke would not suffer it, except they came within musket-shot of our trenches. He observed the enemy’s motions and postures, and said he saw no sign of their designing to fight; only once they drew their army into two lines as if they would fight, and then he sent Lieutenant-General Douglas to order all the foot to stand to their arms; and he sent to the horse, that upon the firing of three pieces of cannon they should return to the camp, but till then to go on with their foraging. Meantime the Duke, as if there was no fear of danger (for he used to say that it was not in their power to make him fight but when he pleased) alighted from his horse, and sat him down upon a little hill, where he seemed to sleep for some time About two o’clock, when the enemy began to draw off, the Duke sent orders for the soldiers to return to their tents.”
“The orders were that night, that none should forage, nor stir out of the camp next day; and that the brigades, that did not mount the guards, should be exercised at firing at a mark when it was fair weather (as it was very seldom), for the Duke knew that most of his men had never been in service, and therefore he would have them taught as much as could be.”
Next day the Jacobite camp was shifted nearer to Drogheda. On Monday all the French Papists in disguise, amounting to about two hundred foot soldiers enrolled in the Huguenot regiments, having been detected were shipped off, except six ring-leaders who were hanged on Thursday, the 26th. If the Duke had given battle on the 21st, they would have then gone over to the enemy.
“The weather for two or three days proved pretty fair and the soldiers were exercised with firing at marks, but it was observable that a great many of the new men, who had match-locks, had so little skill in placing of their matches true, that scarce one of them in four could fire their pieces off; and those that did, thought they had done a feat if the gun fired, never minding what they shot at” (page 24).
The two following extracts from Schomberg’s Despatches[1] justify his management of the campaign:— “Dundalk, 6th October. It appears to me that your Majesty is of opinion that we should push the enemy, before this army perishes by diseases, or the succours arrive which the enemy expect from France. I should desire much to do the things which your Majesty is so eager for. I would have willingly marched to-morrow. But your Majesty will see by the opinion of the General Officers that all the army is without shoes, that it could not march two days without one half being barefooted, and that thus it is necessary to wait till shoes come from England, where Mr. Harbord has sent for them The provision waggons are all arrived, and “their horses are in a very bad state. Shales says that he was obliged to make use of them at Chester, because he could not find any to hire. I have already said that he did not even take care to embark one hundred and twenty artillery horses which are still left there.”[2] “Dundalk, 8th October. I am uneasy to venture your army against one which is (as all the world here knows) at least double the number of ours, of which a part is disciplined and pretty well armed, and hitherto better nourished with bread, meat, and beer than ours. But what is still more annoying is, that the colonels who have lately raised their regiments, and particularly the Irish lords, thought of nothing but to enrol boys at a cheap rate. I clearly foresaw this when their commissions were given them, and I spoke of it to your Majesty at the meeting of the committee for Irish affairs; but Lord Halifax’s advice was followed rather than mine. . . . . Without enhancing my services, or taking any account of the chagrins which I have suffered, it is not without difficulty that I have come here and kept my ground, almost without bread.”[3] Burnet says:— “Schomberg had not the supplies from England that were promised him. Much treachery or ravenousness appeared in many who were employed. And he, finding his numbers so unequal to the Irish, resolved to lie on the defensive. . . . . If he had pushed matters and had met with a misfortune, his whole army and consequently all Ireland would have been lost; for he could not have made a regular retreat. The sure game was to preserve his army; and that would save Ulster, and
- ↑ Sir John Dalrymple in an Appendix of his “Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland,” gives extracts from these Despatches. These (in the original French, the spelling only being modernized) I shall transcribe into the Appendix of this volume. Each Despatch shall be numbered for the purpose of comparison with the translations quoted in the text.
- ↑ Despatch, No. 8.
- ↑ Despatch, No. 9.
