land wrote, “As for King Charles, it is plain that Lord Galway is very ill with him; but I am afraid that will be the case in a month’s time, of anybody else that may be sent, if they do their duty.”
Godolphin consulted with some of his leading political supporters, whether they now had any desire that Lord Rivers should be sent to Spain. He reported the result to the Duke, June 24:—
“I find Lord Halifax, Lord Somers, and their friends are pretty indifferent as to Lord Rivers, and unconcerned whether he is to return or not. But they are very uneasy to think of recalling Lord Galway, though sensible that he must be useless. For they carry that matter so much farther as to think all these misunderstandings are industriously fomented by Count de Noyelles, whom they take to be the principal occasion and contriver of Lord Galway’s misfortunes; for which reason they seem to think, unless he be called home, either before or at the same time with Lord Galway, it will look as if he had been in the right in all he suggested to the King of Spain, and all the reflections which belong to the matter must light upon Lord Galway and England.”
Godolphin concurred in the opinion that De Noyelles was the prime cause of the Spanish disaster, as we find in his letter, dated Windsor, June 26, 1707:—
“One letter of last post from the Hague tells us the Count de Noyelles has written a letter to the States, in which he is pleased to take great liberties with my Lord Galway. We think it pretty hard here, at the same time, that he who has been the visible occasion of our misfortunes in Spain for two years successively, should have the confidence to lay the blame at the doors of others, who have suffered so much, and at so great an expense.”
Godolphin’s plan, which he repeats in his letter of June 27, was as follows:— “As I have told you in my former letter, some of our friends here will be unwilling to bring home Lord Galway, while Count De Noyelles stays with the King of Spain; so the true way to make all things easy will be for the Emperor to send a good general with the troops from Italy.” This, as my readers remember, was Lord Galway’s own plan, urged before the opening of the campaign.
Marlborough, seeing the Government so steady to our hero, wrote in a more satisfactory style to Sunderland:—
“Meldert, June 27. — Nobody can have a better opinion than I have of Lord Galway; but when I consider the Court and King of Spain, I think it would be the most barbarous thing in the world to impose upon Lord Galway to stay, for I am very confident he had rather beg his bread. I am sure I would.”
And he wrote to the duchess, July 4:—
“As to what Lord Sunderland says concerning the King of Spain, that nobody will please him that does their duty, I am of his mind, and I have also as good an opinion of Lord Galway as anybody can have; but that is no argument for Lord Galway’s stay; for, as it is, it will be impossible for those two (Galway and Noyelles) to serve together.”
The Government accordingly took into consideration how they could give Lord Galway a change of command without any implied censure. Marlborough made a series of suggestions (which were adopted), namely, that the English contingent in Spain should be such as a Major-General should command, that officer taking the charge of British troops only; that the Catalan regiments raised by Lord Galway should cease to be in British pay, except indirectly by a pecuniary subsidy; and that Lord Galway should go to Portugal as Ambassador and General. Godolphin hesitated, lest the exchange should not be agreeable to Galway. The Duke replied — September 15, 1707:— “I am sorry to see that you are of opinion that Lord Galway will not care to go to Portugal, for there he might do service; and where he is, I think it is impossible.” The loss of Lerida, as already narrated, which was permitted with the view of vexing Lord Galway, confirmed Marlborough’s fears.
Lord Peterborough’s visit to Vienna was neutralized by Lord Sunderland’s correspondence (see Cole’s “State Papers”). That Secretary of State at last succeeded in convincing Austria of the mistake of neglecting Spain Proper, and of allowing the Spaniards to detect the Imperial family’s lukewarmness and contemptuousness. Austria agreed to send a Marshal to take the chief command in Spain, and this enabled Marlborough to make the suggestions already mentioned. On the English Lord Peterborough made little impression, though he tried to work on a popular prejudice and an insular delusion — the prejudice being against a foreigner (as he insisted on calling Lord Galway), and the delusion being that, if a British General had the command of the whole allied army in Spain, he could do what-
