Page:Radek and Ransome on Russia (c1918).djvu/31

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

whelming majority in the Soviets behind them, their opponents see their best hope of regaining power not in the Soviets, not even in Russia itself, but in some extraordinary intervention from without. By asking for foreign help against the Soviet Government they prove that such help should not be given, and that they do not deserve it. The Soviet has stood for six months and more, absolutely unshaken by any movement against it inside Russia. In the Ukraine the anti-Soviet minorities asked for intervention and received it. German bayonets, German organization destroyed the Soviets of the Ukraine, and then destroyed the mock government that invited their help. We, the Allies, supported that anti-Soviet minority, and, in so far as our help was efficacious, contribute our share in obtaining for Germany many a victorious progress from one end of the Black Sea Coast to the other. In helping the Ukrainian minority we helped the Germans to secure Ukrainian bread and coal and iron that would otherwise have gone to help Russia to recuperate. In Finland we repeated the mistake. We gave at least moral help to the White Finns, simply because they were opposed to the Red Finns, who were supported by the Soviets, not realizing that the White Finns were the pawns of Germany, and that in the defeat of the Red Finns we witnessed the defeat of the only party in Finland which was bound, by its socialistic nature, to be an enemy of imperialistic Germany. Do not let us make the same mistake in Russia. If the Allies lend help to any minority that cannot overthrow the Soviets without them, they will be imposing on Free Russia a government which will be in perpetual need of external help, and will, for simple reasons of geography, be bound to take that help from Germany. Remember that for the German autocracy, conscious of the socialistic mass beneath it, the mere existence of the Soviet Government of Russia is a serious danger. Remember that any non-Soviet Government in Russia would be welcomed by Germany and, reciprocally, could not but regard Germany, as its protector. Remember that the revolutionary movement in Eastern Europe, no less than the American and British Navies, is an integral part of the Allied Blockade of the Central Empires.

And, apart from the immediate business of the war, remember that Germany is seeking by every means, open and secret, to obtain such command over Russian resources as will in the long run allow her to dictate her will to Russia’s people. Remem-

29