Page:Reed v. Goertz.pdf/2

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
2
REED v. GOERTZ

Syllabus

DNA testing procedures denied Reed due process would “amount to a significant increase in the likelihood” that Reed “would obtain relief that directly redresses the injury suffered.” Utah v. Evans, 536 U. S. 452, 464. Second, Texas’s invocation of the State’s sovereign immunity fails because the Ex parte Young doctrine allows suits like Reed’s for declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacities. 209 U. S. 123, 159–161. Third, Reed’s procedural due process claim does not contravene the RookerFeldman doctrine. Pp. 3–4.

(b) The sole question before the Court is whether Reed’s §1983 suit raising a procedural due process challenge to Texas’s post-conviction DNA testing law was timely under the applicable 2-year statute of limitations. The statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff has a “complete and present cause of action,” Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U. S. 192, 201, a determination the Court makes by focusing first on the specific constitutional right alleged to have been infringed. See McDonough v. Smith, 588 U. S. ___, ___. Here, that right is procedural due process. A procedural due process claim is complete not “when the deprivation occurs” but only when “the State fails to provide due process.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U. S. 113, 126. Texas’s process for considering a request for DNA testing in capital cases includes both trial court proceedings and appellate review, which under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 79.1 encompasses a motion for rehearing. In Reed’s case, the State’s alleged failure to provide Reed with a fundamentally fair process was complete when the state litigation ended—when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Reed’s motion for rehearing. Therefore, the statute of limitations began to run on Reed’s §1983 claim when Reed’s motion for rehearing was denied. Pp. 4–6.

995 F. 3d 425, reversed.

Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Gorsuch, J., joined.