Thomas, J., dissenting
and officers, and the nature of a challenged state action determines what federal-court remedy may be available.
As this Court has explained, “[a] State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities,” and “in no other way.” Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 347 (1880). The Due Process Clause applies to action through any of these agencies, ibid., but not every alleged due process violation may be asserted in an original §1983 action. By itself, a State’s legislative enactment of an unconstitutional law does not give rise to a justiciable case or controversy. See California, 593 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 7–9); Muskrat, 219 U. S., at 361. Next, when a State allegedly violates due process through executive action, the aggrieved party may bring an original action for appropriate relief against the relevant executive officer. See Mellon, 262 U. S., at 488; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908).[1] And, when a State allegedly violates due process through its judicial actions—
- ↑ Young cautioned that,
“[i]n making an officer of the State a party defendant in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an act alleged to be unconstitutional[,] it is plain that such officer must have some connection with the enforcement of the act, or else it is merely making him a party as a representative of the State, and thereby attempting to make the State a party.” 209 U. S., at 157 (emphasis added).
Invoking this language, the district attorney argues that Reed’s suit is independently barred by state sovereign immunity, in addition to Article III and the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. It appears fairly debatable whether the “connection” requirement described in Young is best understood as a precondition to Young’s sovereign-immunity exception or as a simple application of Article III traceability. Compare Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F. 3d 405, 410–424 (CA5 2001) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (taking the former view), with id., at 439 (Benavides, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that “modern standing doctrine has subsumed the connection inquiry”). I see no need to tackle that question here, since Article III and Rooker–Feldman amply establish the jurisdictional impropriety of Reed’s suit. I add only that, on either interpretation, Young makes it clear that a state officer cannot be sued “as a representative of the State” writ large—rather, he can only be sued for legal violations attributable to his own office.
