decline, I fear, from the decision of this day; and the Americans will rise to independence, to power, to all the greatness of the most renowned states; for they build on the solid basis of general public liberty.” These were words of wisdom; but nations, like individual men, learn anything sooner than their own faults, and confess anything sooner than their own mistakes.
It is difficult for the historian to understand the policy of attempting to control America by force; for nothing is more certain than that, if we had failed in establishing our independence, Great Britain would also have failed in subjecting us to her schemes. After the shedding of blood at Lexington, reconciliation was impossible; nor is it certain that it could have been accomplished after the massacre in King Street, in 1770. To be sure the proceedings of the towns and the tone of all the memorials and petitions indicate this; but there were unquestionably men who thought it better that the connection should be dissolved at as early a period as possible. These men were right, both as regards our condition and the prosperity of England. Had we remained her subjects, like all colonies, we should have been of no advantage pecuniarily, and most likely a source of some expense. But with independence and the Constitution came prosperity to us, in which, through trade and the increased demand for her manufactures, England has largely participated.
Had she consented, in 1775, to the peaceful dismemberment of her empire, the independence of America, under such circumstances, would have increased her glory, spared her treasury, and saved her laborers from the pressure of taxes under which they have been weighed down. It may be, however, that the war was necessary to us. In ante-Revolutionary times there was not a strong tendency to union—in many parts of the country the opposite feeling existed. Even the Constitution was framed with difficulty, and received with hesitation