Page:Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs (Volume One).djvu/230

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194
SIXTY YEARS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS

most largely to the care of his mother, wife and sisters, who, like himself, were exiles and destitute of the means of subsistence. It is not probable that he anticipated at any time any other assistance than that which might follow an official announcement by the national authorities of an opinion adverse to interference by any state in the affairs of other states. His visit to Washington satisfied him that no such expression of opinion would be made by Congress, or by the administration of President Fillmore.

On the thirtieth day of April, 1852, Kossuth closed a speech in Faneuil Hall, which had occupied two hours and a half in its delivery, with these words: “I cannot better express my thanks than to pledge my word, relying, as I have said on another occasion of deep interest, upon the justice of our cause, the blessing of God, iron wills, stout arms and good swords, and upon your generous sympathy, to do all in my power with my people, for my country, and for humanity.” Thus, as he approached the end of his career in America, he abandoned all thought of securing active interference, or, indeed, of official support in behalf of Hungary, whatever might have been his hopes when he landed in the United States.

During the period of Kossuth’s visit, from December, 1851, to June, 1852, the attention of the country was directed to the approaching Presidential election, and in public speeches and in conversations he attributed his failure to secure the indorsement of Congress and of legislative assemblies to that circumstance. In his first speech in Faneuil Hall he said, “Would it had been possible for me to have come to America either before that contest was engaged, or after it will be decided! I came, unhappily, in a bad hour.” That Kossuth attributed too much importance to that circumstance, there can be no doubt. Other, deeper-seated and more adverse causes were at work. The advice and instructions of Washington as to the danger of entangling foreign alliances were accepted