near New Haven, the conductor brought me a copy of a press despatch which gave an account of the engagement and indicated or stated that the rebels had been successful. On the seat behind me were two men who expressed their gratification to each other, when they read the despatch over my shoulder. When I had a fair view of them, I formed the opinion that they were Southern men returning South to take part in the conflict. It is difficult to comprehend the control which the States’ Rights doctrine had over the Southern mind. In my conversations with General Scott the influence which the course pursued by Virginia exercised over him was apparent. Those conversations left upon me the impression that he had debated with himself as to the course he ought to pursue. Attachment to Virginia was the sole excuse which Lee offered in his letter to his sister which contained a declaration that there was no just cause for secession.
In July, 1861, Washington was comparatively defenceless. Mr. Lincoln was calm, but I met others who were quite hopeless of the result.
My speech upon Emancipation in December, 1861, led to a request from the publishers of the Continental Magazine for an article upon the subject. It appeared in February, 1862, and in that article I set forth the necessity of immediate emancipation as a war measure, and by virtue of the war power, under the title, “Our Danger, and Its Cause.” Rapid changes were then taking place in public opinion, and in Massachusetts the tide was strong in favor of vigorous action. It was arrested temporarily in the summer of 1862, by the untoward events of the war, and the “People’s Party” became formidable for a brief season.
One of the peculiar circumstances of the contest was the acceptance by General Devens of the post of candidate for Governor by the People’s Party. General Devens was then in the army, and with considerable experience he had
