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alteration in its structure was impossible (or at least something which constituted a most hazardous and dangerous operation and in which France had nothing whatever to gain). It was for this reason that, I was energetically and frankly hostile to all those combinations, cherished by certain Allied ambassadors, having for their purpose the „renovation“ of the Government, not to speak of the Regime, or a „change“ in the Monarchy. I saw but one line of conduct, namely consolidation of whatever kind possible and by every means in existence.
Hence, on the outbreak of the Revolution, my first emotion was one of stupor, one of complete despondency and discouragement. Not for one second did I allow myself to participate in the pleasure which then manifested itself in almost all bourgeois circles and with the majority of the members of the Allied diplomatic corps. To me one thing alone was clear, namely that Russia had gone out of the war, that it signified perhaps the breakdown of the Eastern front and on this account, perhaps, the triumph of German Imperialism. It meant such a prodigious increase of effort, that it was impossible for France, who had already been tried so much, to think of it without shuddering. This truth, which I felt instinctively, had been grasped from the very first moment, with a precision and surety of judgment that admitted of no doubt, by our Ambassador at that time, M. Paleologue, who, as he refused to give himself up to chimerical hopes which might become dangerous for France, began to look upon his mission in Russia as one that was practically terminated.
Public opinion in the shape of the Russian
