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b) Secondly, the question of the revolution. This revolution which had become dear to me, and which henceforth I felt to be allied with Russia's power and vitality appearad to me to be in peril. Alarmed at sympathies which I had heard openly expressed in diplomatic circles in favour of a military dictatorship (which for me was the synonym for a catastrophe), it occurred, to me that the October trouble could do nothing but reinforce the dictatorial party. Instead of recognising that the point of support, the centre of gravity of the Revolution was precisely the Soviets (and, of noticing as a consequence, that the Soviets had not only not suffered any reverse by recent events but, quite on the contrary, had just accepted power under their real standard, namely bolshevism)—I saw ail this exclusively in Kerensky, and behind him, in the Constituent Assembly.
My deception and my anxiety can be easily imagined. But, nevertheless, during the first few days (and even during the first few weeks), I remained firmly of the opinion that the October revolution (which according to me was still an insurrection) was quite a temporary affair, and that sooner or later Kerensky would again accept power. Only, he must, of course, arrive in time, that is to say before the Germans would have succeeded in drawing too great a military advantage from the situation and, further, that he must succeed in smashing to atoms the anti-patriotic ambitions of generals whom he would, necessarily, be obliged to have recourse to. This was my only preoccupation at that period and (I may as well say so) my only thought amidst a confusion of reports, as nu-
