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arrived at Moscow, where our Military Mission was located, and where to the Bolshevik Government had transferred itself from Petrograd. Very shortly after M. Grenard's instatement in office, a telegram from M. Pichon was received, requesting that an enquiry be opened as to the opinion of the different political parties regarding an armed Japanese intervention, with a view to driving back the German invasion of Russia. The question of armed intervention of the Allies in Russia, hitherto looked upon from an entirely hypothetical standpoint, was thus raised in a very precise manner. Two opposite points of view quickly asserted themselves on this question. On the one hand intervention with the cooperation, or, at least, the assent of the Bolshevik Government: on the other hand, intervention against this Government and even intervention destined to overthrow it, and to reestablish the eastern front against Germany.
At first, for a brief period, our new Consul-General seemed to hesitate between these two points of view, or rather to attempt to reconcile them, whereas our Military Mission, „under the influence of Captain Sadoul“ was inclined to agree with the first. Attached as I was by my work to the Consulate, it was only rarely that I had relations with the Military Mission, and at that time I did not know Captain Sadoul, whom I had met casually only once or twice, and with whom I had never really had an occasion of conversing. Captain Sadoul was subjected to much violent criticism in our propaganda circles for his attitude. He was „Trotsky's man“, the man whom Trotzky had „the audacity to introduce to our Ambassador“,
