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agents and systematic disorganisers of Russia, was it not absolutely necessary, in the interest of our oen cause in Russia and in the interests of Europe itself that we should oficially break with them? Why were we still fighting them like hypocrites, by unworthy means and always under foreign colours (the White Guards of Yaroslavl, the mutiny of the Czecho-Slovaks) while continuing to give them, in the very eyes of „our Russian friends“ all the moral advantage of our relations and consultations? If it was finally war against Bolshevism, which for my part I had waited for and desired, why was it not preceeded by a declaration of war? Finally, from the point of view of a struggle against German Imperialism, which still remained my predominat preoccupation, I did not at ail perceive what the Czecho-Slovak affair might be used for. I considered it rather dangerous as being likely to call forth a reply from the Germans, by a further advance of enemy occupationary troops in another region of Russia.
Further, the parallel duplicity of the Russian bourgeois parties was also a very disagreeable disillusionment for me. Certainly, I had never cherished any illusion , in regard to the sincerity of their attachment to the French cause in the war, nor of their intention to re-commence, on however slight a scale, the struggle against German Imperialism. I knew very well from the first day that what they expected from our intervention was the overthrow of Bolshevism, the protection of their class interests, with the mental reservation that no sooner had they been reinstated in power, thanks to our assistance, they would begin to bring pressure to
