estimated as 28,78% MAC. The CG llmits at this mass are 13% and 33% MAC. The aircraft was thus correctly loaded.
The underwater inspection of the stabiliser trim actuator jackscrew revealed that 9 screw threads were exposed above the ball nut and 4 threads below the nut. No noticeable bending of the jackscrew had occurred. This suggests that the break in this area may have occurred flush with the ball nut on impact and that the jackscrew may have moved during the break-up following the impact. The actuator setting as found, equates to a CG position of 27% MAC. If the break had occurred flush with the ball nut and if the aeroplane was trimmed for level flight, the CG position would have been 21,47%. Both CG positions are within the safe cruising trim range. With all 159 occupants concentrated in the most forward passenger compartment the CG position would have been 21,5% MAC.
The quantity of aviation turbine fuel in the aircraft at the time of the impact was calculated as approximately 24 370 kg.
Of the 43 225 kg of cargo and baggage carried in the aircraft, 14 588 kg of cargo was loaded on 6 pallets in the main deck cargo compartment. This
