Opinion of the Court
method chosen by plaintiffs—a mailing addressed to the minister of foreign affairs at the embassy—was consistent with the language of the statute and could reasonably be expected to result in delivery to the intended person.” Ibid.
Sudan filed a petition for rehearing, and the United States filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Sudan’s petition. The panel ordered supplemental briefing and heard additional oral argument, but it once again affirmed, reiterating its view that §1608(a)(3) “does not specify that the mailing be sent to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs in the foreign country.” 838 F. 3d 86, 91 (CA2 2016). The court thereafter denied Sudan’s petition for rehearing en banc.
Subsequent to the Second Circuit’s decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held in a similar case that §1608(a)(3) “does not authorize delivery of service to a foreign state’s embassy even if it correctly identifies the intended recipient as the head of the ministry of foreign affairs.” Kumar v. Republic of Sudan, 880 F. 3d 144, 158 (2018), cert. pending, No. 17–1269.
We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 585 U. S. ___ (2018).
II
A
The question before us concerns the meaning of §1608(a)(3), and in interpreting that provision, “[w]e begin ‘where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself.’” Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U. S. 399, 412 (2012) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 241 (1989)). As noted, §1608(a)(3) requires that service be sent “by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the
