XII.
Norfolk, January 25, 1833.
While seeking to establish the right of a State, to secede from an Union formed by a Covenant, the terms of which have been broken by other parties, I was not unaware of the objections that have been urged against the existence of such a right, not only by the author of this Proclamation, but by others of the School of Consolidationists. But I did not choose to break the thread of the argument, by replying to these objections at that time. Therefore, I assumed all the facts necessary to present the naked question of mere right. Having established this, I will now attend to these suggestions. Many of them have been before noticed and answered; and I will not here repeat these answers. But there is one which has not yet been presented, and to the examination of this, I propose to dedicate this number.
This objection is, that no State may rightfully assume as a fact, that the Covenant has been broken by any of its co-States, or act upon such an assumption, without violating its own faith: because the covenant itself has provided an arbiter to decide all such questions, by whose decisions the faith of all the parties must be bound. This arbiter is said to be the Supreme Court of the United States. To this objection, which is founded upon the supposed existence of a common arbiter, authorized and capable to decide all infractions of the Constitution, of which any State may have cause to complain, many answers may be given, all equally conclusive to shew, that no such arbiter, clothed with such authority, either does, or ought to be expected to exist.
The first of these answers is, that according to no legal possibility, could the case supposed to exist, ever be presented to the Supreme Court for its decision, even if the sovereign parties were content to abide by that decision.—The Judges of the Supreme Court, like all other Judges, are appointed to decide "cases," and
