Page:Reyes Mata v. Lynch.pdf/10

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152
REYES MATA v. LYNCH

Thomas, J., dissenting

(discussing this distinction). Courts routinely construe ambiguous filings to make sense out of them, as parties—both counseled and uncounseled—sometimes submit documents lacking even rudimentary clarity. See, e. g., Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1287 (MD Ala. 2013) (“The flings and arguments made by the plaintiffs on these claims were mystifying at best”). Recharacterization is something very different: It occurs when a court treats an unambiguous fling as something it is not. That practice is an unusual one, and should be used, if at all, with caution. See Castro, 540 U. S., at 385–386 (opinion of Scalia, J.). Courts should not approach recharacterization with a freewheeling attitude, but with “regard to the exceptional nature of recharacterization within an adversarial system.” Ibid. Recharacterization has, for example, been used “deliberately to override the pro se litigant's choice of procedural vehicle.” Id., at 386 (disapproving of the practice). But it is not the role of courts to “create a `better correspondence' between the substance of a claim and its underlying procedural basis.” Ibid.

In my view, then, it makes all the difference whether the Court of Appeals here properly construed an ambiguous motion or recharacterized an unambiguous motion contrary to Mata's stated choice of procedural vehicle. Although the majority's opinion does not address this point, Mata's motion to reopen does not expressly state whether he was invoking statutory relief under 8 U. S. C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) or instead requesting sua sponte reopening under the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) asserted inherent authority. Had the Court of Appeals engaged in the discretionary action of construing that ambiguous filing, it might not have abused its discretion by concluding that Mata really meant to ask for sua sponte reopening rather than equitable tolling of the statutory time bar.

The Court of Appeals, however, did not purport to construe an ambiguous motion. Instead, it applied what ap-