Government and Property
the enjoyment of those things which, according to the dictates of nature, make life possible. Without them, "me" disappears. The raw material for those things are all about "me," put there by the same intelligence that put "me" on this earth. But it so happens that this profusion of life-giving materials serves "me" inadequately until it is transformed into consumable shape. "Me" must go to work on those things so as to make them contributory to life; and though "me" finds labor wearisome and undesirable, so strong is the will to life that this aversion is overcome. Thus, some part of "me" is invested in what "I" wanted to enjoy; it would not have existed and could not be enjoyed unless that investment of labor were made. It is by virtue of this investment of "me" that the desirable thing becomes "mine." It is "mine" because "I" made it.
Title to things, or the right of property, enjoys moral validity, therefore, only when it rests on labor.[1] Any other theory of property rights must begin by rejecting the right of the individual to himself and must assume that the successful use of force to separate the producer from his product is title enough. Putting aside moral considerations, title resting on the use of force is transitory, vague, and uncertain, because it must change with every change in the incidence of force. Thus, the slave owner enjoys the chattel's property only so long as he can exert force on the slave; when the slave overthrows his master, the title to property reverts to the former slave. The thief becomes an honest man and the honest man a thief according to which is stronger. Whenever we invoke
- ↑ Title to property must include the right to its value, if any. The baker's right to eat the pie he made cannot be questioned. Neither can he be denied the right to accept in exchange for the pie the equivalent of two pies, if anybody should make the offer. The labor theory of property has nothing to do with the labor theory of value.
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