and, although there are limits to how precise one can be in light of the very general nature of the materials, it is difficult to see how he would have been in a position to take the shot if he was located at the southern end of the compound as described by the applicant.
330 The second objective matter which supports the evidence of Persons 14, 24 and 18 as to the location of Persons 14 and 24 is Person 14's role at W108 and the position of W109 to the north of W108. As I have said, Person 14 was the patrol scout or lead soldier of the lead patrol into W108. There was obvious potential for threats to emerge from the uncleared areas between W108 and W109. I agree with the respondents' submission that it accords with sound military tactics that Person 14 and the cordon formed by Person 6's patrol was in the position indicated by Person 14. If it were otherwise, there would be a significant area unprotected in terms of attackers coming from W109 or persons attempting to leave W108, that is to say, squirters.
331 Person 14 referred in his evidence to his approach and being "obviously trained" towards W109 and kneeling on one leg at a tree which was "roughly in line with the edge of Whisky 108 towards Whisky 109". Other witnesses supported or implied that it made sense that Person 14 and the cordon formed by Person 6's patrol would be in the position indicated by Person 14. Person 41 was cross-examined about the positions that might be adopted by a patrol performing the task of a cordon. He agreed that he would not put himself in a position where he was in an open field without cover. Significantly, he agreed with the proposition put to him by counsel for the applicant that while on the cordon, the task was to monitor activity at W109 to keep an eye out for spotters, who may have approached from the direction of W109.
332 Person 5 was cross-examined about the positon of Person 6's patrol. He said that Person 6's patrol was on the north-western side of the compound. Initially, he disagreed with the proposition that to place the cordon generally in the area identified by Person 14 was "tactically sensible". When it was suggested to him that it would be tactically sensible to put the cordon in the general area identified by Person 14 because the cordon could then deal with threats to the north and west of the compounds and squirters, he answered "potentially, yes".
333 Person 29 was asked whether there would have been a cordon placed to guard against any further threats from W109 had there been two engagements outside W108 with the insurgents thought to have emerged from W109. He answered that that would be correct and that that was his understanding of what Person 18 was doing and Person 6's patrol was doing, that is to say, guarding against potential threats from W109.
