PART 2 — THE IMPUTATIONS CONVEYED OR COMMUNICATED BY THE ARTICLES
28 The principles which govern the determination of meaning are not in dispute. They are summarised in Hockey v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 652; (2015) 237 FCR 33 at [63]–[73] per White J and V'landys v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (No 3) [2021] FCA 500 at [41]–[55] per Bromwich J.
29 Questions of meaning are determined objectively by reference to the "ordinary reasonable reader". The applicant carries the onus of satisfying the Court that the matters sued upon carry the pleaded meanings. The characteristics of the ordinary reasonable reader have been identified in a number of cases, including Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 (Lewis v Daily Telegraph) at 258–260 per Lord Reid; Farquhar v Bottom [1980] 2 NSWLR 380 at 396 per Hunt J; Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden (1998) 43 NSWLR 158 at 165; and Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1995] 2 AC 65 (HL) at 69–74. With respect, a clear statement of the attributes of the ordinary reasonable reader is set out in the decision of the High Court in Trkulja v Google LLC [2018] HCA 25; (2018) 263 CLR 149 (at [32]):
… The ordinary reasonable person is not a lawyer who examines the impugned publication over-zealously but someone who views the publication casually and is prone to a degree of loose thinking. He or she may be taken to "read between the lines in the light of his general knowledge and experience of worldly affairs", but such a person also draws implications much more freely than a lawyer, especially derogatory implications, and takes into account emphasis given by conspicuous headlines or captions. Hence, as Kirby J observed in Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd, "[w]here words have been used which are imprecise, ambiguous or loose, a very wide latitude will be ascribed to the ordinary person to draw imputations adverse to the subject".
(Citations omitted.)
30 As I have said, the applicant pleads that the imputations are conveyed or communicated by the natural and ordinary meaning of the matters complained of. The nature and ordinary meaning of words is not limited to their literal meaning.
31 In Lewis v Daily Telegraph, Lord Reid said (at 258):
What the ordinary man would infer without special knowledge has generally been called the natural and ordinary meaning of the words. But that expression is rather misleading in that it conceals the fact that there are two elements in it. Sometimes it is not necessary to go beyond the words themselves, as where the plaintiff has been called a thief or a murderer. But more often the sting is not so much in the words themselves as in what the ordinary man will infer from them, and that is also regarded as part of
