them at first; they were elected by the plebeian assembly, held office for one year, and had no insignia of office.
Right of Intercession. — The tribunes were above all to protect individual plebeians against the patrician magistrates. Accordingly, when appealed to, they were authorized personally to protest, or intercede (jus auxilii, intercedendi), against an official act of the consul while it was being performed. The result was to annul it; but, if repeated later without tribunician protest, it was valid. They could liberate a man who was arrested, or protect him, if he was compelled to enlist in the army or to pay a temporary tax (tributum). They were in general able to cancel all the consular measures of coercion or punishment.
In every case the intercession of one tribune was sufficient and final, and could not be vetoed by his colleague. But the right of intercession could be exercised neither beyond the mile limit, nor outside the Servian wall against a consul who had departed from the city on a campaign, nor anywhere against a dictator.
Tribunician intercession was not different in character from that of one consul against the other; but it became preëminent because it could be exercised against tribunes as well as consuls, and also because the tribunes had at first so few positive powers. In the course of time it was extended in practice; and, by vetoing the acts of the magistrates concerned, a tribune was able to prevent or annul general administrative measures, the holding of elections, the passage of bills and of senatorial decrees.
Criminal Jurisdiction of the Tribunes. — The tribunes might, on appeal, investigate a case to see whether there was sufficient cause for intercession. In this manner they exercised a quasi-jurisdiction. Their chief judicial function was to punish the violators of the sacred law of 494. This could
