defence, but that he sought the above conflict with his usual ardour, and made use of a justifiable ruse de guerre to accomplish his wishes, we doubt not that it will be considered one of the most heroic, if not the most unequal, of all the frigate actions fought during the late war. We shall merely add, that he thereby saved the British frigates off Port Louis, from the consequences of an attack which the enemy would doubtless have made upon them with his united force, had M. Duperré proceeded thither instead of suffering himself to be decoyed into the harbour of Grand Port; and that by deterring the Windham from following her consorts, he rendered a most important service to his country, as the masts and stores of that ship enabled Captain Rowley to re-equip the Africaine frigate, at a most critical moment, and by doing so, to regain our naval superiority in the Indian ocean[1]. The manner in which that ascendancy was for a short time lost by the British is thus described in an official letter from Captain Pym to Captain Rowley:
- ↑ See Vol. I. note at p. 631. N.B. It will be seen by the extract of Captain Willoughby’s official report, and the note † at p. 169, that the enemy’s united force would have been five heavy frigates and two corvettes; whereas the Sirius, Iphigenia, and Magicienne, were only rated at 36 guns each; and the latter armed in a similar manner to la Nereide. In the said note we observe a typographical error, – la Bellone and Minerve were both 18-pounder frigates – the latter, however, was pierced for 52 guns. Since the preceding sheet was printed, it has been suggested to us, that probably Captain Bouvet, on finding l’Isle de la Passe in the possession of the British, imagined that the districts of Savanne and Grand Port were likewise held by them, in which case his ultimate capture was inevitable; it being impossible for him to repass la Nereide, with the wind then blowing. To this erroneous impression on Mons. Bouvet’s mind, the officers and men in the boats of la Nereide were, perhaps, indebted for their safety. It is also probable that the French captain imagined, as the boats were filled with marines and soldiers, that they belonged to the shore, and not to the British frigate.
The gentleman from whom we received the above hint acquaints us, that la Bellone’s best bower anchor was cut away from the bow by la Nereide’s shot, but owing to the cable being stoppered in board, it did not take the ground – a circumstance much to be regretted; for had the anchor gone to the bottom, the ship in rounding to, must inevitably have got on shore, and would consequently have lain with her head exposed to la Nereide’s raking broadside.
