commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, with whom he returned two days afterwards to Algiers. The Dey still continued obstinate in his refusal, and a blockade was established, during the whole period of which the Naiad was employed on that coast.
A very gallant exploit, subsequently performed by the boats of the Naiad, is thus described by Captain Spencer in an official letter to the commander-in-chief, dated May 24, 1824:–
“Sir,– I have much satisfaction in acquainting you with the complete destruction of the Algerine brig of war, lately reported to you, moored alongside the walls of the fortress of Bona, by the boats of the Naiad, under the command of Lieut. Quin, first of this ship.
“If, in detailing this affair, I should trespass somewhat at length on your time, I trust. Sir, you will attribute it solely to my anxious desire that the conspicuous merit of the officers and men in the boats, and their gallant leader, should have due credit, the whole plan of the operations having been formed, and all the details arranged, entirely by Lieut. Quin himself; excepting that I objected to his proposal of bringing the brig out, knowing her situation to be such as would risk very many lives in the attempt.
“The boats left the Naiad at half-past eleven last night, and being guided in their approach by the lights and fires in the different batteries, pulled for what proved to be a sixteen-gun brig of the largest class, whose position was of extraordinary strength, and far beyond what I had even imagined possible. – She was moored head and stern, in addition to a chain cable fast on shore, in a bight within about eighty feet of the walls of the fortress, upon which I counted at least forty pieces of cannon, some flanking her on either side, none further off than short cannister range, and several within her own length, amongst which latter were the sixteen guns belonging to the brig herself, the enemy not unreasonably conceiving that, by placing them there, in preference to keeping them in her, all attempts at boarding must be rendered ineffectual by their fire. I have reason to believe, the greater part of her crew were landed to work them, the whole of the Turkish garrison, of about four hundred soldiers, having sufficient employment in managing the other guns, and keeping up a heavy fire of musketry from the embrasures and wall, almost overhanging her deck. A few sailors, left as look-outs, escaped to the shore, leaving the brig so lightened as to cause the greatest difficulty in ascending her sides. All these obstacles, and the tremendous fire of cannon and small arms, kept up during the whole time the boats were in sight, which, from the illumination caused by the burning vessel, was lengthened, served only as a means of shewing how vain all resistance is, when British seamen and marines are led by their officers in the way they were upon this occasion. Lieute-