Page:Royal Naval Biography Marshall v2p1.djvu/357

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POST-CAPTAINS OF 1801.
345

To secure a diversion on the side of the citadel in case of calm, or tie wind not answering for the ships, I sent the carronade-boats and two Spanish gun-boats to take a position close in-shore, with orders to commence a fire on St. Carlos, on observing the appointed signal at Montjui or the town. About ten the wind came off the land; I weighed, but at half-past one finding no attack, and the breeze dying away, I anchored again. No symptom of attack took place; and from what I have since learnt, it is most fortunate for the inhabitants that it did not. It appears that the garrison of Montjui was relieved on the day before, therefore that part of the plan was done away with; and I understand, as if with an intention of marring the whole affair, that General Coupigny had (at the same time) ordered one of his aides-de-camp to proceed to Moulins de Re, and take the command of the whole. The imaginary laurels of the other chiefs now vanished from their sight, and ‘like true Spanish Patriots,’ they determined within themselves, that through their assistance the unwelcome aid-de-camp should not gain the wreath: they accordingly threw every difficulty in his way. Moreover, Colonel Green informs me, that this commander was quite appalled at the miserable banditti which had been placed under his orders. They consisted of 200 hussars, the scum of a Spanish regiment, some Miquelets, and the rest Simotines. But, my Lord, the reply that was made by the officer at the head of General Coupigny’s staff, to the inquiry of Colonel Green, ‘what were likely to be the movements of the Spanish army of Tarragona?’ will better explain to your Lordship the style of action, and manner of thinking of the General and his advisers, than if I were to write volumes; viz. ‘That the troops would not change their quarters, until the result of the attack on Barcelona should be known.’ So that 10,000 regular troops were to rest upon their arms and look on, while a handful of armed peasantry should attack one of the strongest fortresses in the Spanish dominions.”

On the llth July following, Captain Mundy writes thus to Lord Collingwood:

“My Lord.– I have the honor to report, that the French General Duhesme, came out of Barcelona on the night of the 7th inst., with a force of near 2,000 troops, 2 howitzers, and 3 field-pieces, and early the next morning occupied the heights in the rear of Badalona and Mougat, also those villages. His intention was to have surprised and surrounded the inhabitants of that part of the country, and to have forced them to repair the bridge and broken roads of Mougat, in order that he might get his artillery towards Mataro, and occupy the coast. The Spaniards, however, got previous notice of his project, and quitting their habitations fled to the mountains. The enemy did not appear in any number until some hours after day-break; and when discovered, were only in small detachments. The carronade-boats under the orders of Lieutenant Hawkins were sent to annoy them, which service was performed with such effect, that the enemy was obliged to bring the whole of his guns, &c. on the beach to their support. The boats returned the fire with their usual firmness. I immediately weighed to cover them; and with a few well-directed broadsides, obliged the artillery to make a precipitate retreat into Barcelona, and with