was not excessive, to attack them; and if they were under sail, to do so in the night, I felt my situation critical. I was alone and could not get assistance for some time. If I were driven out of the Archipelago, the whole of the islands would he instantly overrun by the Turks, and our character and influence suffer in consequence. On the contrary, if I could strike a blow on the first that came out, it would give them an earnest of what the British could do; it might possibly prevent the rest from coming out, and would certainly exalt our character with the Greeks, especially if it saved their islands from pillage. A pretty good judgment may be found of my feelings when I got sight of two Turkish men-of-war, between the islands of Scopulo and Killidroni. It was a fine morning when we saw them; we were standing towards Sciatho. I could not think how they came there, as I had only that day (July 5th, 1808) heen positively assured by a polacre, that the Turkish squadron was still at Sciatho; I feared they might he line-of-battle ships coming to reinforce the others, and was distressed at the thought of it. They passed to windward of the island, and we worked up towards it. In the afternoon there suddenly came on a strong north wind: I continued snug under the island, knowing they would come to leeward of it before night, if they could not get to Sciatho.
“I was walking the deck with much anxiety when, at half-past six, a large frigate, with fifteen ports on a side, was observed coming through the passage between Scopulo and Killidroni. Then followed a smaller ship, with thirteen ports on a side; and then a galley. This seemed to be within my compass. I knew my crew to be brave active men, and purposely kept from engaging the enemy until dark, when I judged we should have a greater advantage in manoeuvring.”
The brilliant result of the Seahorse’s night action with this Turkish force is thus officially described by Captain Stewart, in a letter to Lord Collingwood, dated off Skiro, July 6th, 1808.
