inference. Yet it would be absurd to say that the reader does not know that the newspaper announces the King's death.
We must, therefore, admit as derivative knowledge whatever is the result of intuitive knowledge even if by mere association, provided there is a valid logical connection, and the person in question could become aware of this connection by reflection. There are in fact many ways, besides logical inference, by which we pass from one belief to another: the passage from the print to its meaning illustrates these ways. These ways may be called "psychological inference." We shall, then, admit such psychological inference as a means of obtaining derivative knowledge, provided there is a discoverable logical inference which runs parallel to the psychological inference. This renders our definition of derivative knowledge less precise than we could wish, since the word "discoverable" is vague: it does not tell us how much reflection may be needed in order to make the discovery. But in fact "knowledge" is not a precise conception: it merges into "probable opinion," as we shall
