905, 908 (2d Cir.1980) (section 410(c) raises a rebuttable presumption shifting burden of coming forward with evidence to defendant). The presumptive validity of the certificate may be rebutted and defeated on summary judgment. Seiler v. Lucasfilm, Ltd., 808 F.2d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826, 108 S.Ct. 92, 98 L.Ed.2d 53 (1987).
Payday advances three arguments to rebut the presumption of validity. First, it argues that S.O.S.’s initial registration was a fraud on the copyright office which should prevent S.O.S. from enforcing its copyright. Second, Payday argues that the registrations were defective because they failed to disclose that Payday employee Sharon Goodman was a joint author of the software. Finally, Payday asserts there is an issue of fact as to the ownership of modifications made by Chu and Koyama after their regular employment with S.O.S. ended. We will address each of these contentions in turn.
1. Fraud on the Copyright Office
In S.O.S.’s initial application for copyright registration, S.O.S. identified itself as sole author of the payroll software, even though the work included the Brown Tank programs prepared by Hagen. S.O.S. subsequently filed a supplemental registration disclosing its use of Brown Tank. Payday asserts that this omission was a fraud on the Copyright Office which should be remedied by barring S.O.S. from enforcing its otherwise valid copyright.
We need not decide whether S.O.S.’s registration was in fact fraudulent for failing to disclose the identity of an unpublished underlying work. “Absent intent to defraud and prejudice, inaccuracies in copyright registration do not bar actions for infringement.” Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir.1984). Payday alleges that S.O.S. intentionally omitted reference to Brown Tank in its registration in order to facilitate execution of a writ of seizure against Payday. However, this writ was quickly modified, and Payday has not claimed any injury resulting from it. Payday has not demonstrated prejudice that would persuade us at the summary judgment stage to prohibit S.O.S. from pursuing its claim of copyright infringement.[1]
2. Joint Authorship
Payday argues that S.O.S.’s registration is invalid because it failed to designate Sharon Goodman, a Payday employee, as a joint author. Although Payday frames its joint authorship argument only in terms of its effect on S.O.S.’s registration, it should be noted that if the claim were successful it would dispose of the merits. As a joint author, Payday (through Goodman) would be entitled to modify, reproduce, or distribute copies of the work. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), 106(1)–(3); Pye v. Mitchell, 574 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir.1978).
Authorship is a question of fact. Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes and Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d 973, 980 (9th Cir.1987). Payday has not presented evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding joint authorship. Payday alleges only that Goodman told the programmers what tasks the software was to perform and how it was to sort data. She did none of the coding and does not understand any computer language.
A claim of joint authorship on similar facts was rejected in Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F.Supp. 1307, 1318–19 (E.D.Pa.1985), aff’d, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031, 107 S.Ct. 877, 93 L.Ed.2d 831 (1987). In that case, a dental laboratory owner commissioned software for use in his business, disclosed to the programmers the detailed operation of his business, dictated the functions to be performed by the computer, and even helped design the language and format of some of the screens that would appear on the computer’s visual displays. The court nonetheless found that the programmer was the sole author of the software. The court’s principal focus was on the creation of the source and object
