Page:S v Makwanyane and Another.djvu/107

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This was recognised by the Hungarian constitutional court in the case in which it considered the constitutionality of the death penalty:

'It is the untouchability and equality contained in the right to human dignity that results in man's right to life being a specific right to human life (over and above animals' and artificial subjects' right to being); on the other hand, dignity as a fundamental right does not have meaning for the individual if he or she is dead. … Human dignity is a naturally accompanying quality of human life.' (Decision No 23/1990, (X.31.) AB, George Feher translation)

[328]The right to dignity is enshrined in our Constitution in section 10:

'Every person shall have the right to respect for and protection of his or her dignity'.

The importance of dignity as a founding value of the new Constitution cannot be overemphasised. Recognising a right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of human beings: human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and concern.[1] This right therefore is the foundation of many of the other rights that are specifically entrenched in chapter 3. As Brennan J held when speaking of forms of cruel and unusual punishments in the context of the American constitution:

'The true significance of these punishments is that they treat members of the human race as non-humans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded. They are thus inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the Clause that even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity.' (Furman v Georgia 408 US 238 at 272,3 (1972))

[329]Respect for the dignity of all human beings is particularly important in South Africa. For apartheid was a denial of a common humanity. Black people were refused respect and dignity and thereby the dignity of all South Africans was diminished. The new constitution rejects this past and affirms the equal worth of all South Africans. Thus recognition and protection of human dignity is the touchstone of the new political order and is fundamental to the new constitution.

[330]But human dignity is important to all democracies. In an aphorism coined by Ronald Dworkin 'Because we honour dignity, we demand democracy'.[2] Its importance was recognised too by Cory J in Kindler v Canada (1992) 6 CRR (2nd) 193 (SCC) at 237 in which he held that '[i]t is the dignity and importance of the individual which is the essence and the cornerstone of democratic government'.[3]


  1. See, for discussion of the right to dignity and the death penalty, the judgment of Solyom J in the Hungarian case concerning the constitutionality of the death penalty (Decision no 23/1990 (X.31.) AB, George Feher translation).
  2. See Ronald Dworkin Life's Dominion: An argument about abortion and euthanasia (1993) at 239.
  3. See also S v Ncube 1988 (2) SA 702 (ZS) at 717 B–D.